Growing Up in Society - a Historical Social Psychology of Childhood by Gabriel, Norman
www.ssoar.info
Growing Up in Society - a Historical Social
Psychology of Childhood
Gabriel, Norman
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Gabriel, N. (2017). Growing Up in Society - a Historical Social Psychology of Childhood. Historical Social Research,
42(4), 207-226. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.207-226
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55152-3
Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
Norman Gabriel: 
Growing Up in Society -  
A Historical Social Psychology of Childhood. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.207-226 
 
Cite as: 
Gabriel, Norman. 2017. Growing Up in Society - A Historical Social Psychology of 
Childhood. Historical Social Research 42 (4): 207-226.  
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.207-226. 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr. 
Published in: 
Historical Social Research 42 (2017) 4 
Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
All articles published in this Special Issue:
Stefanie Ernst, Christoph Weischer & Behrouz Alikhani 
Changing Power Relations and the Drag Effects of Habitus. Theoretical and Empirical Approaches  
in the Twenty-First Century. An Introduction. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.7-21 
Nico Wilterdink 
The Dynamics of Inequality and Habitus Formation. Elias, Bourdieu, and the Rise of Nationalist Populism. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.22-42 
Nina Baur 
Process-Oriented Micro-Macro-Analysis. Methodological Reflections on Elias and Bourdieu. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.43-74 
Sandra Matthäus 
Towards the Role of Self, Worth, and Feelings in (Re-)Producing Social Dominance. 
 Explicating Pierre Bourdieu's Implicit Theory of Affect. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.75-92 
Guido Becke 
The Subjectivation of Work and Established-Outsider Figurations. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.93-113 
Bernd Sommer 
Externalisation, Globalised Value Chains, and the Invisible Consequences of Social Actions. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.114-132 
Inken Rommel 
“We are the People.” Refugee-‘Crisis,’ and the Drag-Effects of Social Habitus in German Society. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.133-154 
 
John Connolly & Paddy Dolan 
Habitus, the Writings of Irish Hunger Strikers and Elias’s The Loneliness of the Dying. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.155-168 
 
Stephen Vertigans 
Death by ‘African’ Democracy. Killing Consequences of Western Power Prognosis. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.169-188 
 
Behrouz Alikhani 
Post-Democracy or Processes of De-Democratization? United States Case Study. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.189-206 
 
Norman Gabriel 
Growing Up in Society. A Historical Social Psychology of Childhood. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.207-226 
 
Florence Delmotte, Heidi Mercenier & Virginie Van Ingelgom 
Belonging and Indifference to Europe. A Study of Young People in Brussels. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.227-249 
 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr. 
i t i l i l  
i t ri  i lf r  
Historical Social Research 42 (2017) 4, 207-226 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.4.207-226 
Growing Up in Society - A Historical Social  
Psychology of Childhood 
Norman Gabriel ∗ 
Abstract: »Aufwachsen in (der) Gesellschaft. Eine historische Psychologie der 
Kindheit«. This paper develops a historical social psychology that can be used to 
understand young children’s social development. It compares the theoretical 
frameworks of three of the most important relational thinkers in the 20th cen-
tury – Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, and Erich Fromm – to shed light on their 
attempts to integrate the insights of psychoanalysis into their sociological per-
spectives. I begin by exploring Bourdieu’s “uneasy” relationship with psychoa-
nalysis, arguing that this has led to a less than successful quest by his followers 
for bridging concepts that can further develop the concept of social habitus. 
Fromm, one of the foremost but relatively neglected psychoanalysts of his gen-
eration, developed a relational psychoanalysis to explain the social relatedness 
of individuals in society. However, although his key concept of social character 
is a bold attempt to make sense of the historical forces that shape our individ-
ual and collective lives, it is still too heavily tied to the influence of economic 
structures in society. I argue that Elias is a more consistent, relational sociolo-
gist, able to develop highly nuanced concepts that can fully explain the social 
habitus of young children, focusing on his concept of “love and learning rela-
tionships” to explain how they grow up in society. 
Keywords: Elias, Bourdieu, habitus, social character, social psychology, relation-
al sociology, childhood. 
1.  Introduction1  
This paper focuses on how relational sociologists can develop a historical so-
cial psychology, one that can best integrate the findings of psychoanalysis in a 
way that is suitable for explaining young children’s development in contempo-
rary society. It begins by exploring the work of Pierre Bourdieu who provides a 
set of relational conceptual tools, capitals, habitus and field, to overcome the 
traditional micro-macro divisions in sociology – these relational tools can be 
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used to locate and understand children’s relationships within broader institu-
tional structures. However, although his concept of habitus is an important 
attempt to explain the durable structures characteristic of social groups and 
their dominant practices, I will argue that it is developed in relative disciplinary 
isolation, without fully integrating the findings of psychoanalysis. As a result, 
there remains a conceptual impasse in recent Bourdieusian scholarship over the 
meaning of habitus and the best way forward to fully develop and integrate the 
“psycho-social” aspects of his theory. 
According to Durkin (2015) this failure to try to understand the role of psy-
chodynamic factors has left contemporary sociological analysis incomplete – 
since the mid-part of the twentieth century a great deal of sociological theory 
has advanced very little. He argues that a return to Erich Fromm, therefore, 
offers the chance to deepen and broaden sociological thinking, to draw out 
some of the important differences between Fromm’s social psychology and 
Bourdieu’s sociology. In the 1930s Fromm had already developed a distinctive 
psychoanalytic approach, one which was interpreted 50 years later in relational 
and inter-subjective psychoanalysis as a great paradigm shift. 
Fromm’s work is an important attempt to bring psychological depth to soci-
ological analysis by developing a relational psychoanalysis that can explain the 
social relatedness of individuals in society. His key concept of social character 
tries to explain the historical forces that shape our individual and collective 
lives. In his early descriptions of different social character structures, Fromm 
used the Freudian terminology of oral, anal, and genital – for instance, calling 
the capitalist character structure anal because it expressed instrumental ration-
ality, possessiveness and orderliness while different character traits would be 
common in other societies. In later studies his terminology is less directly 
Freudian, specifying productive and non-productive social characters and sub-
dividing the latter even further. Nevertheless his analysis of social character is 
to a large extent still too heavily tied to the influence of economic structures in 
society, especially social class, and therefore insufficiently attuned to explain-
ing processes of change in different social groups in society. 
I then turn to Norbert Elias’s version of social habitus, arguing that it ena-
bles sociologists to focus on how social-psychological processes change over 
time. It provides a much needed conceptual breakthrough that moves beyond 
the “psychologistic” overtones of Fromm’s concept of social character and 
Bourdieu’s unresolved and uneasy relationship with psychoanalysis. Although 
critical of traditional Freudian psychoanalytic concepts, Elias integrated and 
synthesised them in a highly original fashion, developing a network language 
to explain how individuals are intertwined in a web of interweaving, intermesh-
ing relationships (Lavie 2011). Individuality is therefore a process embedded in 
society with a specific history so that every process of socialisation – through 
which the social standards of behaviour and feeling that are transmitted to 
individuals – is also a process of individualisation, where each individual child 
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makes his/ her own subtle adaptations to these standards. To further develop 
my argument I focus on Elias’s concept of “love and learning relationships” 
which explores the significance of social learning as young children grow up in 
society. 
2.   Bourdieu’s Relational Concepts 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts of field, habitus and capital are an im-
portant part of his attempt to overcome the traditional micro-macro divisions in 
sociology. Although Bourdieu mainly focused on school-age children and 
adults, his concepts can easily be adapted to study the lives of infants, toddlers, 
and pre-school children, as well as those just entering school. His theoretical 
framework is important for providing a set of relational conceptual tools that 
can be finely tuned to explain the shifting fields of power that affect the lives of 
young children in changing institutions. In a recent book on Childhood with 
Bourdieu there are four chapters that apply his theoretical perspective to early 
childhood (Alanen et al. 2015), reflecting a growing interest in the way that 
sociologists of childhood can apply this perspective to understand the interde-
pendent relationships between young children, their peers and adults in chang-
ing institutional arrangements (Gabriel 2017). 
According to Bourdieu (1990), we can best understand social development 
and change as taking place through the ongoing struggles that exist over a 
range of scarce goods and resources, which are not simply economic but also 
take on social and cultural forms. He conceived of four different types of capi-
tal which are often deeply inter-related and partly transposable. Economic 
capital, “which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalised in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986, 243); cultural 
capital which consists primarily of what is to be perceived to be legitimate 
knowledge and behaviour and may be institutionalised in the form of educa-
tional qualifications; social capital which relates to the prestige and influence 
gained through relationships and connections with powerful others; and sym-
bolic capital which represents the status and honour that is associated with the 
acquisition of one or more forms of capital once they have been perceived and 
recognised as legitimate by others. The social habitus can be understood as a 
set of predispositions to ways of thinking and behaving that have been acquired 
over time through experience. In early childhood, it refers to the internalization 
of wider structures and processes manifested through the routines and taken-
for-granted actions of young children: the longer a young child is located with-
in a particular set of relationships the more likely they are to develop a practical 
sense of how to behave and act in certain ways. 
Central to the concept of capital is its exchange value and its capacity 
through investment of time and effort to be converted from economic capital 
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into both social and cultural capital. This was outlined in Bourdieu and Pas-
seron’s (1977) early work on education where for example economic capital 
enables parents to send their young children to private schools to learn and 
appropriate certain valued forms of cultural capital. The acquisition of both 
economic and cultural capital enables a young child to develop valued relation-
ships with powerful people and acquire certain positions within society. Cul-
tural capital has particular currency in the field of education, comprising em-
bodied (dispositions, sets of meaning, and modes of thinking), objectified 
(access to cultural goods such as art, literature) and institutionalised forms 
(educational or academic qualifications) which are given recognition by those 
already dominant within a particular field. Those with the recognised cultural 
capital are deemed competent in their knowledge and confident in their capaci-
ty to generate long-term benefits from their investment in education. 
In an important article Serre and Wagner (2015) offer an approach to cultur-
al capital that emphasises its relational dimension. They argue that there is 
more at stake in Pierre Bourdieu’s differentiation between kinds of capital than 
merely conceiving of social space as multi-dimensional by taking the variety of 
available resources behind their accumulation into account. The concept of 
cultural capital is mainly intended to make us think about mechanisms for 
legitimation. Contrary to what the most common uses of the notion of capital 
might lead us to think, capital is not a simple quantity of symbolic or material 
goods, defined once and for all, leaving only its unequal distribution to be 
measured: it is mainly a social relationship of domination that has important 
consequences within a specific field. 
Serre and Wagner (2015) therefore claim that sites of cultural production 
(especially schools) have the function of legitimating power and keeping social 
order. The cultural capital that Bourdieu identified is less defined by its content 
(legitimate practices, educational qualifications) than by how it is acquired, 
which naturalizes domination and makes it invisible. This is why it is so im-
portant to explain all the different aspects of cultural capital – incorporation, 
institutionalization, objectification – as they relate to distinct and complemen-
tary mechanisms of domination. Incorporation presupposes a long period of 
invisible inculcation work from the youngest age, characteristic of incorporated 
cultural capital as it appears in language, knowledge and habits. Institutionali-
zation is tied to the power of guarantee vested in institutions of learning. Objec-
tification, by the ownership of cultural goods, manifests capital’s patrimonial 
dimension. These mechanisms guarantee cultural capital’s effectiveness when 
it is “used as a weapon and as a stake in struggles” (Bourdieu 1979, 5). 
However this process of institutionalized education, as Bourdieu has argued, 
only represents one of the ways in which the distribution of power across social 
groups is achieved. Alongside the school, young children will come to learn 
and internalize a particular way of thinking and behaving through their family 
relationships as well as through the broader experiences gained through the 
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wider community. Connolly and Healy’s (2004) ethnographic case study of 
two groups of 7-8 year old working-class girls living in Belfast, Northern Ire-
land, for example, showed that the school itself played only a partial role in 
influencing their educational and career aspirations. Of equal significance was 
the influence of the local neighbourhoods within which the young girls lived. 
Their emerging gendered habitus was constructed through discourses on ro-
mance, marriage, motherhood and childhood rather than a concern with their 
education and future careers. To explain this influence, they used Bourdieu’s 
(1990) concept of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is a process whereby 
individuals can contribute toward their own subordination by gradually accept-
ing and internalizing those very ideas and structures that tend to subordinate 
them. 
3.   ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Habitus 
Wacquant (2014) has brought another important nuance to this concept of 
habitus by drawing our attention to Bourdieu’s (2000, 161) later emphasis on 
its malleability, “Habitus change constantly as a function of new experiences.” 
A key aspect of the concept of habitus is that it incorporates past experiences 
which are modified by present ones, as well as a sense of a probable future 
(Bourdieu 1990), although early influences always bear more weight. Relations 
between socialization and social position remain central in more pliable notions 
of habitus, emphasising both its layered nature and its restructuring as an ongo-
ing process. 
Wacquant (2014) argues that we need to elaborate on Bourdieu’s distinction 
between primary and secondary habitus, introduced in his work on education 
and underlying his analysis of the nexus of class and taste in Distinction. The 
primary habitus is the set of dispositions one acquires in early childhood, slow-
ly and imperceptibly, through familial immersion; the schemes of action and 
perception that have been transferred during childhood are an education that is 
linked to the parents’ social position in the social space. Therefore, the primary 
habitus is about internalizing the external as the parents’ modes of thinking, 
feeling and behaving that are linked to their position in the social space are 
internalized in the children’s own habitus. The family is the “primary habitus” 
or main institution where young children initially internalise ways of thinking 
and types of dispositions from their parents or carers. Although families are 
still important in the shaping of young children’s lives, young children are not 
mere receptors of family socialisation, but active generators of their own social 
and cultural capital in early years settings. These settings can usefully be 
viewed within the concept of a shifting and competitive field, one that enables 
us to develop an understanding of when and where particular forms of capital 
become valued or diminish in importance and eventually decline. 
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We can further develop the concept of the primary habitus by exploring how 
young children are able to accumulate their own stocks of social capital 
through strategic use of networks.Devine (2009), for example, considered how 
migrant children in Irish primary schools were not merely receptors of their 
family’s capitals but active generators, contributing to processes of capital 
accumulation through their negotiation and positioning between home and 
school. 
She particularly noticed that friendships were important sources of social 
capital, facilitating access to networks that provided relief from the demands of 
formal learning, as well as support and knowledge when challenges emerge. 
These friendships gave young children a feeling of belonging and ‘getting on’ 
in their everyday lives in school. The “durable obligations” (Bourdieu 1986, 
249) built up through these social networks ensured that they could draw on 
their friends to help them with school work, especially homework, as well as 
defend them if they were being racially abused. It therefore seems that in young 
children’s peer groups, especially where economic capital is not directly used, 
the importance of social capital is emphasised. 
The primary habitus is also fashioned by tacit and diffuse “pedagogical la-
bour with no precedent”; it constitutes our social personality as well as “the 
basis for the ulterior constitution of any other habitus” (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977, 42-6). Pedagogical labour is about transformation, who defines what 
shape it will take and how it is experienced in practice by young children. 
Bourdieu captures these tensions when he speaks of social spaces as fields of 
struggle, caught between forces of transformation and preservation depending 
on access to power and resources. His relational understanding of the organiza-
tion of the social is presented through field theory, where the position of an 
agent in a field can only be understood in relation to other positions in that 
field. Practices are relational, causes are always interdependent, and no investi-
gator’s pre-conceived assertion of hierarchical relations of causal dependency 
informs the relational organization of the social (Crossley 2011). When placing 
themselves and objects within a field, agents follow an ordering of relations 
that is structural and objective. Individuals are positioned independently of 
their will and intentions, even though their choices modify their original place-
ment. 
Wacquant (2014) argues that the primary habitus is a springboard for the 
subsequent acquisition of a secondary habitus, an organisational system of 
transposable schemata which bear the mark of much effort and self-discipline. 
The secondary habitus is built on the primary habitus and especially results 
from one’s education at school and university, but also from other life experi-
ences. This important distinction between primary and secondary habitus is 
similar to the contrast made by Bourdieu (1984, 65-8) between “the two modes 
of acquisition of culture,” the familial and the academic, the experiential and 
the didactic, which indelibly stamp one’s relation to cultural capital. Lizardo 
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(2004) offers a very helpful way of illuminating the subtlety of the concept of 
habitus and its important application for understanding the lives of young chil-
dren. He explores the little recognised influence of Jean Piaget on Bourdieu’s 
thinking, arguing that a great deal of the conceptual apparatus of the habitus 
can be traced back to his distinctive blend of structuralism and developmental 
cognitive psychology. 
For Piaget (1954), the child’s cognitive development is driven by a constant 
process of assimilation of new information and accommodation of pre-existing 
structures to fit recurring but not necessarily identical situations in the material 
and social world. The concepts of assimilation and accommodation were at the 
heart of his relational perspective. Young children are inherently incomplete: 
they need nourishment in relation to the environment in order to move toward 
equilibration. Since no form of nourishment is itself complete, they must accept 
it, changing the form of nourishment whilst at the same time changing them-
selves. In the dynamics of this relationship, both young children and their envi-
ronment change in relation to each other. Piaget’s theory is therefore best un-
derstood as a relational-historical process (Fogel et al. 2006). 
Lizardo (2004) argues that Piaget’s major influence on Bourdieu’s concep-
tion of habitus is his emphasis that knowledge and higher levels of symbolic 
thought arises from these bodily schemas and practices which consist primarily 
of internalized structures that correspond with reality. He suggests that we can 
identify two principal themes in Bourdieu’s thinking about habitus and the 
origins of practical action: first, belief, both in the sense of subjective harmony 
and objective coordination between the internal and the external, is a bodily 
phenomenon and second, practical action arises out of the operation of motor 
and operational schemes. The key idea borrowed by Bourdieu from Piaget 
consists of the notion that the body itself can be both the site and the primary 
source of operations that come to acquire increasing generality and flexibility 
through experience, but which can also become conserved through sustained 
repetition. For example, a young child might begin with a simple set of behav-
ioural responses, grasping or sucking that after continual attunement to the 
environment come to be deployed in a wider class of situations and thus be-
come a generalized bodily schema. It is therefore important to explore how 
embodied dispositions in early childhood are acquired in the primary habitus, 
focusing on how they can be related to affective dispositions and explained 
through the lens of psychoanalysis. The primary habitus as “embodied history, 
internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history” (Bourdieu 1990, 56) 
never loses its impact and always influences the development of the secondary 
habitus. 
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4.   Psychoanalysis in Bourdieu’s Work 
Fourny and Emery (2000) have suggested that Bourdieu’s early disavowals of 
psychoanalysis in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to the increasing importation 
of psychoanalytic concepts into his texts. For example, in relation to his expla-
nation on an embodied habitus, he links human behaviour to the “bodily emo-
tions” of shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety and guilt (Bourdieu 2001), or to 
an innate, nonmaterial desire to negate the ultimate absurdity of existence by 
attaining distinction and recognition from others (Wacquant 2006). Next, he 
uses such concepts as “libido,” “misrecognition,” “illusion,” “sublimation,” 
“denial,” “projection,” “identification,” “ego splitting,” and “phallonarcissism,” 
not to mention the ever-present psychoanalytic resonances of “habitus” and 
“dispositions” (see Bourdieu 1993). However, despite Bourdieu’s rapproche-
ment with psychoanalysis in some of his language and occasionally at a more 
systematic theoretical level, he never fully acknowledged the implications of 
Freudian theory for his own approach: 
Sociology does not claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psy-
choanalysis; it is concerned only to construct differently certain givens that 
psychoanalysis also takes as its object. (Bourdieu 1999, 512) 
Steinmetz (2006) argues that if Bourdieu had explored this relationship in more 
depth he might have seen that they were not alternatives, but that psychoanaly-
sis filled some of the lacunae in his own theoretical approach. His treatment of 
Freudian psychoanalysis more often takes the form of admitting Freudian ter-
minology and even some psychoanalytic arguments into his texts while sur-
rounding these passages with rhetorical devices that seem to condemn it. Ac-
cording to Steinmetz (2006) Bourdieu’s continual return to and disavowal of 
psychoanalysis has an obsessive quality, suggesting that he knows, but does not 
want to know, how it might inform and transform his own theory. 
However, despite the uneasy relationship Bourdieu had with psychoanalysis 
and his refusal to recognise the ways in which both disciplines informed his 
concepts, in particular those of habitus, misrecognition and symbolic violence, 
a close reading of his texts reveals the many psychological and psychoanalytic 
terms increasingly appearing in his work over time (Steinmetz 2006). In Pas-
calian Meditations he argues that 
Sociology and psychoanalysis should unite their strengths (but to do so they 
would need to overcome their prejudices against each other) to analyze the 
genesis of investment in a field of social relations. (Bourdieu 2000, 198-9) 
Reay (2015) argues that it is this fusion of both psychological and psychoana-
lytic insights with a sociological understanding of habitus that has the potential 
to be useful. She suggests that such “generative possibilities” are most apparent 
in Bourdieu’s own work when he writes about the divided or cleft habitus 
(Bourdieu 1999, 2000). Bourdieu asserts a number of times in his texts that 
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habitus is fundamentally about the integration or the lack of integration of the 
disparate experiences that make up a biography (Bourdieu 1984), but it is par-
ticularly when there is a lack of integration that (Bourdieu 1990) begins to 
write about internal conflicts and powerful emotions. Emotions can be regarded 
as resources which can be circulated, accumulated and exchanged for other 
forms of capital within a particular field that allows those resources to count. 
As a type of capital it can be defined “as the stock of emotional resources built 
up over time within families and which children could draw upon” (Reay 2004, 
61). Feminist theorists have also extended Bourdieu’s notion of capital so as to 
be able to capture investment in non-convertible goods like love and well-being 
(Skeggs 2004; Illouz 2007). 
Reay (2015) believes that we can shed light on the development of the “psy-
chosocial” when we extend notions of habitus to include affective dispositions, 
consisting, in part, of bodily beliefs that are passions and drives, where the 
confrontation between the habitus and the field is always marked by affectivity. 
While Bourdieu does not focus on what it is that holds together and drives 
affective engagements with interpretations of the world, in his later writings he 
increasingly addresses such subjective emotional processes (see Atkinson 
2012; and Matthäus 2017, in this HSR Special Issue). This is most evident in 
the introduction of the concept of “a socialized libido” (Bourdieu 1998, 78) that 
energizes agents’ investments in a field (Green 2008). In accounting for these 
emotional drives, Bourdieu makes extensive use of psychoanalytic vocabulary 
such as energies, drives, and desire (Fourny and Emery 2000). Atkinson (2016, 
58-9) argues that we can build upon Bourdieu’s suggestions to open up new 
avenues of research, viewing love and care as a relatively autonomous form of 
capital that is struggled for within the familial field. This capital sought within 
the family is a primal one – to love and be loved is one of the earliest and most 
pervasive of human desires. Once the child’s libido has been channelled to-
wards the attainment of recognition within the domestic field, it is directed 
towards the accumulation of specific economic and cultural capital. 
Nevertheless, despite these recent attempts by Reay and other followers of 
Bourdieu to refine the psychoanalytic aspects of Bourdieu’s thought by subtly 
redefining it in a more sociological direction (see, for example, Darmon 2016), 
or by explaining processes of change within the habitus across generations by 
drawing on post-Freudian psychoanalytic concepts (Aarseth et al. 2016), there 
still remains an important conceptual impasse and disagreement in recent 
Bourdieusian scholarship over the meaning of “habitus” and the best way for-
ward to fully develop and integrate the “psycho-social” aspects of his theory. 
Lahire (2003), for example, suggests that the notion of “disposition,” which is 
central to Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus, is based upon tacit and problematic 
assumptions which have never been tested empirically. By universalizing the 
accomplishments of the psychology of his time Bourdieu committed psycholo-
gy to a set of concepts which have become petrified and have hardly changed 
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in 30 years, even though they represented a summary of some of the most 
advanced psychological research into the development of children. He argues 
that a sociology at the level of the individual should fill the gap left by theories 
of socialisation which rhetorically refer to “the internalization of what is exter-
nal” and “the embodiment of objective structures.” Lahire’s work (see, for 
example, Lahire 1998, 2002) focuses on the plurality of dispositions and on the 
variety of situations in which they manifest themselves: the relative coherence 
of habits, schemes, or dispositions that individuals may have internalised de-
pends on the coherence of the principles of socialisation to which they were 
exposed. The more individuals have found themselves simultaneously in a 
variety of non-homogenous, sometimes even contradictory situations, and the 
more such situations were experienced at an early stage in life, the more such 
individuals will show a heritage of non-unified dispositions, habits and abilities 
varying across the social contexts in which their personal development took 
place. We will now consider Erich Fromm’s relational psychoanalysis, which 
will be used as a helpful counterpoint to Bourdieu’s sociological perspective. In 
direct contrast to Bourdieu, Fromm was a trained psychoanalyst very familiar 
with Freudian concepts – his social psychology was an important attempt to 
develop a more adequate sociological starting point for psychoanalytic theory. 
5.  Erich Fromm and Relational Psychoanalysis 
A distinctive school of relational psychoanalysis developed from the early 
1980s in the work of Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), who posited a relational 
model in opposition to classical Freudian drive theory. This “new tradition” 
draws on three long-standing bodies of thinking in psychoanalysis: the Ameri-
can interpersonal tradition (see, for example, Sullivan 1953), which emphasised 
the importance of understanding the network of relationships within which 
individuals exist; the British object relations tradition (Bowlby 1969; Winnicott 
1965); and the more recent work of American psychoanalytic feminists (Ben-
jamin 1998; Chodorow 1999; Dimen 2003). According to Roseneil and Ke-
tokivi (2016) each of these lineages of theory posed its own challenges to the 
monadic model of drive theory, with its primary focus on intra-psychic pro-
cesses, on the quest for rational control by the ego and the developmental goal 
of separation and autonomy. Their shared orientation conceptualises the self as 
relationally constituted, where the matrix of mother or career-child relations 
provides the very conditions of possibility of existence for the young, depend-
ent child. Hence, from the beginning, the self is intrinsically social, our sense 
of autonomy and agency inherently relational. 
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) distinguish between drive and relational 
models in psychoanalysis. They place Erich Fromm firmly within the relational 
model and characterize his approach as “humanistic psychoanalysis.” Accord-
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ing to Cortina (2015), Fromm’s work can best be seen as an application of 
humanistic principles to a variety of topics, beginning with his revision of 
Freud’s libido theory based on a socio-psychoanalytic theory of character de-
velopment (Fromm 1932, 1980). Funk (2015) has argued that one of the im-
portant influences on the development of Fromm’s social-psychoanalytic theo-
ry was his intense exchange with Harry Stack Sullivan, who saw the person not 
in terms of drives, but in his or her relatedness to reality. Sullivan’s focus on 
the question of interpersonal relatedness encouraged Fromm to understand a 
person’s need for relatedness as the main psychological problem and to revise 
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. 
In the 1930s Fromm was at the vanguard of the social-psychological attempt 
to make sense of the social and historical forces that shape our individual and 
collective lives. Fromm and the other Freudian-Marxists (see in particular 
Reich’s Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis, which appeared in 1929) 
sought to bring the critique of mechanical Marxism into distinctive psychoana-
lytical territory. What psychoanalysis could bring to historical materialism was 
the knowledge of the human personality as a factor in the social process, con-
sidered in connection with economic, financial and cultural factors. 
Fromm elaborated these thoughts in an essay completed in the summer of 
1937, which was received unfavourably by his colleagues at the Institute for 
Social Research and therefore remained unpublished (Funk found this essay, 
thought lost, in 1990 in the part of Fromm’s estate deposited at the New York 
Public Library). In this essay he writes 
The most important elements of the psychic structure are the attitude of the 
individual to others or to himself, or, as we should like to say, the basic hu-
man relation, and the fears and impulses which, in part directly, in part indi-
rectly, arise out of this behaviour (Fromm 2010 [1937], 44). 
Fromm refers here to relatedness as the “basic human relation” to emphasise 
that the person does not exist other than as a relational being, where the con-
crete manner of his or her relatedness arises from a social process. Fromm later 
on in this paper (2010 [1937], 58) writes that  
Society and the individual are not ‘opposite’ to each other. Society is nothing 
but living, concrete individuals, and the individual can live only as a social 
human being. [original emphasis] 
What is distinctive in Fromm’s psychoanalytic approach is that he understands 
the person as always related to others. Funk (2015) argues that this primary 
sociality should not only be understood in the sense of interactive sociality but 
as a social relatedness that precedes all other perceptions of relatedness, one 
that can be explained by the concept of social character. 
Social character theory (Fromm 1941, 1947) was an attempt to bridge a 
missing link in Marxist thought. How are shared ideologies that reflect eco-
nomic modes of production created and reproduced? Operating as a reciprocal 
mediator between the economic superstructure and the narcissistic needs of the 
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individual, social character encourages ideological incorporation by playing a 
key role in the maintenance of an unjust society and its economic foundations 
(Fromm, 1962). Fromm (1947, 68) pointed out that the family and social insti-
tutions act as “psychic agents of society,” which inculcate shared social values 
and beliefs beginning early in childhood. Shared values and beliefs become 
internalized as emotionally based character traits that operate automatically, so 
that people will “want to do what they have to do” in order to adapt to society 
(Fromm and Maccoby 1970, 18). Once created, social character functions as a 
social glue that helps group members identify with each other and bond togeth-
er. This alignment requires that socialisation misguides people into actively 
accepting the legitimacy of the desires and pursuits prescribed for them by 
[shaping] the energies of the members of society in such a way that their be-
haviour is not a matter of conscious decision as to whether or not to follow the 
social pattern, but one of wanting to act as they have to act and at the same 
time finding gratification in acting according to the requirements of the cul-
ture. (Fromm 1955, 77; original emphasis) 
Fromm’s development of the concept of social character therefore involved a 
significant theoretical move. With this concept he explained how society and 
the individual were mutually determined, producing and reproducing each 
other. Social character emerges from a process that channels human desires and 
drives into patterned dispositions which are adjusted to existing social and 
economic conditions. The formation of social character thus reflects how social 
class structures and divides society, shaping early socialisation experiences 
within different family groupings. 
6.  Norbert Elias’s Conceptual Breakthrough 
Elias’s conceptual breakthrough is first evident in the development of innova-
tive relational concepts in the Society of Individuals, Part 1, 1939. Elias’s vi-
sion was a challenge to Freud, yet its aim was not to place society or groups as 
alternatives to the human individual, but to study individuality more deeply. 
Elias indicates how individuality is a process embedded in society with a spe-
cific history and therefore every young child in society is “thoroughly individ-
ualized and socialized at the same time” (quoted in Brown 1997). He devel-
oped, integrated and synthesised concepts in a highly original fashion, using a 
network language of interweaving, intermeshing relationships: 
But what we have here characterised as ‘interweaving’ to denote the whole re-
lationship of individual and society can never be understood as long as ‘socie-
ty’ is imagined, as is so often the case, essentially as a society of ‘finished’ in-
dividuals who were never children and never die. One can only gain a clear 
understanding of the relation of individual and society if one includes in it the 
perpetual maturation of individuals within a society, if one includes the pro-
cess of individualisation in the theory of society. The historicity of each indi-
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vidual, the phenomenon of growing up to adulthood, is the key to understand-
ing what ‘society’ is. The sociality integral to human beings only becomes ap-
parent if one is aware what relations to other people mean for the small child. 
(Elias 2010, 28-9) 
According to Kilminster (2007) Norbert Elias is at once less “economistic” 
than Marx and more sociological than Freud. He argues that Elias profoundly 
sociologises Freud by providing a multi-levelled model of the embodied human 
personality that derives its specific character from the complex self-steering 
activities of people. The modern personality is one in which ego and super-ego 
functions have become increasingly differentiated from drives; that is, less 
accessible to them – something that is the result of a long social and historical 
process that is reinforced through high thresholds of shame, embarrassment and 
repugnance in relation to dealing with natural functions and with bodily vio-
lence, meat preparation and eating. This capacity for developing forms of self-
restraint is central to Elias’s argument in On the Process of Civilisation (2012): 
the increasing social constraint towards self-constraint is related to more de-
manding standards of self-control. Social pressures lead to more self-control, 
with the behaviour of individual people being regulated “in an increasingly 
differentiated, more even and more stable manner” (Elias 2012, 406). 
An integral aspect of this civilizing process is that young children should 
eventually grow up through their own self-regulation. Elias mentions a unique 
human capacity “for controlling and modifying drives and affects in a great 
variety of ways as part of a learning process” (Elias 2007, 125). He argues that 
though there is a great deal of psychological and physiological literature on 
learning there is very little on the structuring of the habitus through learning 
(Elias 2008, 93). What remains unexplored is the establishment of controlling 
impulses which interpose themselves between the recurrent upsurge of drives 
from lower biological levels and skeletal apparatus towards which they are 
directed. For small children, feeling and acting, moving one’s skeletal muscles, 
one’s arms and legs and one’s whole body are not yet divorced: it only later 
appears in adults as a “feeling state” (usually referred to as emotions) when 
they gradually learn to do what small children are never able to do, not to move 
their muscles, not to act in accordance with their emotional impulses. But this 
process is largely forgotten as adults, where a high level of civilizing restraint 
forms part of their social habitus. This restraint appears to grown-ups as “au-
tomatic,” a part of their “second nature” which is treated as something with 
which they were born. 
Elias (2011) argued that the capacity of young human beings to steer their 
conduct by means of learned knowledge gave them a great evolutionary ad-
vantage over other species that were unable to accomplish this at all or only to 
a very limited extent. He refers to this process as humankind’s “symbol eman-
cipation.” In the evolutionary process, the biological propensity for learning is 
one of the main differences between animal and human societies, providing a 
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framework for social development to take place without any biological chang-
es. In the development of language, for example, a young child develops into a 
human being and is integrated into a particular society by learning to produce 
words and sentences which are understood by others. For Elias (2009a, 147), 
there are “natural human structures which remain dispositions and cannot fully 
function unless they are stimulated by a person’s ‘love and learning’ relation-
ship with other persons.” This important relational concept of love and learning 
aptly summarises a great deal of previous psychological research on young 
children’s development, bringing together specialised areas within psychology 
(particularly the separation between cognitive, social and developmental psy-
chology). 
To highlight the strong, affective ties that link people with one another, Eli-
as also used the notion of valency to refer to the relational way in which people 
are directed toward other people: some are already firmly connected with cer-
tain people, while others are free and open, and search for people with whom to 
form bonds. He argued that the concept of valencies is more suitable than the 
term libido because it draws attention to the group character of emotional 
bonds. Elias therefore emphasises the importance of personal interdependen-
cies and emotional bonds which binds society together: human beings are so-
cial beings embedded in figurations which are interdependent webs and net-
works that are always moving, changing and developing. 
Important points of connection can be made between Elias’s concept of 
“love and learning relationships” and the relational turn in developmental psy-
chology. The work of Colwyn Trevarthen (2005) is a good starting point for 
developing this relational approach to young children’s development because 
he synthesizes a great deal of recent neurological, biological and psychological 
research to highlight the unique biological equipment of human beings that 
prepares babies, infants and young children to enjoy and share companionship 
with others. Trevarthen (2005, 60-1) emphasizes how the “human body and 
brain” are adapted for communication: momentary shifts of gaze and “gazing 
reverie” are made possible by the distinctive white sclera of human eyes and 
the versatility of human vocalization achieved by the “uniquely adapted human 
respiratory system.” Moving selves regulate contact with one another by “felt 
immediacy” (Braten 2009) with emotions that direct an awareness of one an-
other with different degrees of intimacy. The development of a young child’s 
emotional health and future well-being in society depends on these unique 
human gifts for interpersonal life and sympathetic emotions (Trevarthen 2011). 
Stern (1985, 6) also begins in the pre-verbal realm, suggesting that “several 
senses of the self do exist long prior to self-awareness and language.” Pre-
verbal awareness is linked by Stern to direct experience, which takes place not 
in the subject or the object, but in the relation itself. During very early devel-
opment, the infant is endowed with an innate capacity of subject-subject en-
gagements, in a game of bi-directional communication that enables the infant to 
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  221 
possess direct “alter-centred participation.” He treats the relation as the node of 
creative interpersonal potential, shifting away from an individualistic self-self 
model of interaction, toward a radically empirical notion of immanent relation-
ality. According to Stern, events in early infancy lead to the creation of modes 
of organisation which do not pre-exist experience – they are immanent and part 
of the field of relations. He questions 
the entire notion of phases of development devoted to specific clinical issues 
such as orality, attachment, autonomy, independence, and trust. [...] The quan-
tum shifts in the social ‘presence’ and ‘feel’ of the infant can [...] no longer be 
attributed to the departure from one specific developmental task-phase and the 
entrance into the next. (Stern 1985, 10) 
This new perspective in developmental psychology represents a breaking point 
with the Freudian and Piagetian legacy anchored to egocentric assumptions 
(Ferrari and Gallese 2007). Stern (1985) moves beyond the limiting concept of 
the sensory-motor schema by developing the idea of “vitality affects,” which 
are characterised by personal feelings as well as dynamics of movements – they 
are usually understood as the pre-verbal force of what will become emotions. 
He was well aware of the complexity of the concept of vitality affects, so he 
defined its meaning as “elusive qualities [which] are better captured by dynam-
ic, kinetic terms” (Stern 1985, 54). While humans are accustomed to experienc-
ing discrete affects, from joy to distress and disgust to wonder, they appear 
very early in life when infants begin to experience pleasure and displeasure that 
is connected to somatic states. What is typical of vitality affects is the close 
connection with the vital processes of the body, such as breathing, sleeping and 
the rising and declining of emotions. Infants, in their early stages of develop-
ment, begin to recognise and give meanings to all these processes. 
McCarthy and Prokhovnik (2014) have also explored the relational aspects 
of embodiment that encompass actively enfleshed beings, incorporating the felt 
and sensory qualities of experience and its everyday practices. They view 
Blackman and Venn’s (2010, 14) idea that “bodies should be defined by their 
capacities to affect and be affected” as a radical form of relationality, drawing 
attention to “entanglements” of relationality which subvert ideas of relation-
ships as an “interaction effect between pre-existing entities” (Blackman and 
Venn 2010, 10). This embodied relationality allows us to consider a close, 
enfleshed, relationship as generating an “us” that helps to shape the “me” and 
“you,” constructed through diverse cultural and personal resources. While 
“you” and “I” potentially have multiple identities, “us” is a field of emotional 
intensity between “me” and “you,” expressed in an embodied orientation which 
includes but is not reducible to an affective attunement. 
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7.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that we should see Bourdieu and Fromm’s sociolog-
ical attempts to grapple with and overcome some of the underlying assump-
tions that lie behind the Freudian model of society as bold but largely unsuc-
cessful. When ideas of “emotional energies,” “libidinal drives,” and “socialized 
drive” are introduced from psychoanalysis into Bourdieu’s theoretical frame-
work, an impasse emerges – instead of further developing the underpinnings of 
his theory to include emotional dimensions and gain better insights into what it 
is that drives different figurations of socialized desire, we end up with a limited 
analysis of how affects boost and impede the optimization of capital (More 
2013). His concept about the socialisation of subjective drives is insufficiently 
developed: even when drawing on a psychoanalytic vocabulary Bourdieu con-
tinues to portray socialization in terms of processes that are “based in training 
and conditioning – metaphors inescapably linked to behaviourism” (Widick 
2003, 687). I have also suggested that there remains a conceptual impasse in 
recent Bourdieusian scholarship over the meaning of “habitus” and the best 
way forward to fully develop and integrate the “psycho-social” aspects of his 
theory. 
In direct contrast, Fromm’s development of the concept of social character 
involved a significant theoretical step in integrating the insights of psychoanal-
ysis into a sociological perspective. With this concept he explained how society 
and the individual were mutually determined, producing and reproducing each 
other. The formation of social character reflects how social class relations 
structure and divide society. But greatly influenced by Marx, Fromm over-
emphasised the economic determinants of character structure, especially social 
class. He proposed that the content of a group’s or a person’s social character is 
largely determined by the economic structure of a society because specific 
familial relations of socialisation are strongly influenced by social class. More 
specifically, Fromm saw social character as the result of the dominant patterns 
of socialisation within a social class or group as these are formed by history 
and the economic conditions of society. 
I have argued that because Elias is less tied to integrating economic catego-
ries based on Marx and more adept at developing the sociological implications 
of Freud, he is a more consistent, relational sociologist than Bourdieu and 
Fromm. In the Society of Individuals and On The Civilising Process Elias car-
ried out one of the earliest interdisciplinary studies of the 20th century, trying 
to overcome the old paradigm which studied the individual (psychology) and 
the social (sociology) separately, divorced from the generational and historical-
ly specific conditions in which they evolved. He uses highly nuanced concepts 
that can more fully explain the development of socio-psychological processes 
in society, emphasising the strong, affective ties that link people with one an-
other across generations in different societies. To illustrate my argument I drew 
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attention to the great potential of Elias’s concept of “love and learning relation-
ships” for explaining the social development of young children. The relation 
between love and learning was used as a sensitising concept to focus on the 
way in which young children’s development is both a cognitive and affective 
process, one that enables us to integrate the findings from other disciplines 
apart from sociology, especially in developmental psychology. It also provides 
a much needed tool to develop “a theoretical scheme for the formulation and 
study of problems concerning the individual and group level of human beings” 
(Elias 2009b, 172). 
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